THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE CORPS
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR AND THE
FUTURE OF THE CORPS
Major Robert David Steele,
USMCR
Cleared for Publication 28
April 1992
The Marine Corps, in combination with
supporting Navy
elements,
is our Nation's "911" force, well‑positioned to serve
in a
variety of joint, combined, and‑‑if necessary‑‑unilateral
roles
across the spectrum of combat and non‑combat operations.
The
Department of the Navy 1992 Posture Statement, and the
Remarks
of General Carl E. Mundy, Jr. Before Congress (Gazette,
April
1992), clearly outline how far we have come revitalizing
our
traditional emphasis on littoral operations, and how we are
preserving
our core capabilities in the face of imposed
reductions.
All this is good. Never‑the‑less, lost in the vortex caused
by a
changing Unified Command Plan, sharp reductions in manning
and
resources, and mixed (or absent) signals from national and
defense
intelligence about the nature of the future threat, is
the
fundamental fact that war as we know it has been transformed.
The
future of the Corps depends not just on getting leaner while
maintain
its traditional expeditionary emphasis, but on our
recognizing
that we must train, equip, and organize our forces to
deal
with four completely distinct types of opposing warrior
classes.
GUERRILLA
Physical
HIGH TECH WARS LOW TECH Natural
Stealth,
BRUTES
BRUTES Stealth,
Precision
(MIC/HIC)
(LIC) Random
Targeting Money‑‑Ruthlessness Targeting
ECONOMIC WAR Power Base TERRORISM
Cyber‑ Knowledge‑‑Ideology Ideo‑
Stealth,
HIGH TECH LOW
TECH Stealth,
Database
SEERS
SEERS Mass
Targeting
(C3I WAR) CULTURAL (JIHAD)
Targeting
WARS
Figure 1. Four Warrior Classes Illustrated
Although appearing complex, the above
figure simply shows
essential
distinctions between each warrior class: its power
base,
its preferred mode of warfare, its stealth mode, and its
targeting
approach. Additionally, the figure shows
the four
kinds
of war (guerrilla, terrorism, cultural, and economic) which
might
be encountered between different sets of warrior classes.
I have elected to identify these four
classes of warriors as
the
high‑tech brutes, the low‑tech brutes, the high‑tech seers,
and
the low‑tech seers. Something of their
nature is illustrated
in
Figure 1. Each of these warrior classes
has different
strategies,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Each
has a
different
source of power, a different approach to warfare, and a
different
command and control, communications, computer, and
intelligence
structure which must be dominated in the attack and
the
defense.
Below are four summations of each warrior
class.
High Tech Brutes |
Low Tech Brutes
|
Rely on money and capital, |
Rely on "low slow singleton"
physical stealth of equipment,| invisibility
which creates a
and precision targeting by | "needle in the haystack" prob‑
highly technical munitions. | lem for high‑tech brutes; use
Vulnerabilities include | randomness of route and of
command & control links, and | objective to frustrate pre‑
especially commercial commun‑ | planned
physical surveillance.
ications paths; also financial| Relatively invulnerable as
databases. | a class of warriors due
to
Capabilities unsuited for | high profit (drugs) and high
combat against low‑tech single| availability
of expendable
and mobile targets, mass | individuals.
movements of non‑combatants. |
Capabilities match goals.
|
‑!‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑|‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
High Tech Seers |
Low Tech Seers
|
Reliant on knowledge and |
Reliant on ideological ap‑
cyber‑stealth (invisible | peal to masses.
access to knowledge bases). |
Impervious to high‑tech
Vulnerable as a class to | brute attack if latter pulls
electromagnetic terrorism | punches and fails to take the
which "melts down" entire | ideo‑cultural high ground;
communications and computing | oblivious to terrorism, and
infrastructures, but single | insensitive to knowledge or
hackers are relatively | profit pressures.
invulnerable to detection and | Can only be defeated by a
control. | comprehensive
ideological and
Unable to deal with low‑ | cultural campaign which wins
tech seers or low‑tech brutes.| away its grass
roots support.
|
Figure 2. Four Warrior Classes Described
High‑tech brutes design systems which can
defeat known and
predictable
opposing capabilities. They cannot
handle ambiguity
nor
can they handle non‑conventional defenses or attacks.
Low‑tech brutes, in the short‑run, will be
extremely
successful. In the long‑run, unless they develop an
ideology (or
form
an alliance with low‑tech seers already possessing an
ideology),
they lack the mental/spiritual energy that religion or
ideology
can provide, and therefore can be defeated.
Both in the short‑run and the long‑run,
the ability of low‑
tech
to defeat high‑tech cannot be underestimated‑‑low‑tech, by
relying
on the human factor, introduces to warfare an unexcelled
capability
for dealing with ambiguity and creating unanticipated
scenarios. The fact that they do not seek political
control of a
society,
and can therefore develop various levels of
accommodation
and co‑existence, also makes it difficult to
eradicate
this class of warriors.
In considering high‑tech seers, it is
useful to surface the
distinction
between "thinkers" and "process" servers. Many of
the
humans associated with the computer industry are in fact
nothing
more than unthinking data‑entry "slaves". Even the
notorious
(or illustrious) "hackers" can be considered
"unthinking"
to the extent that they exercise their pleasure
"mindlessly",
to no objective end. The most dangerous
enemy is
that
very small group which is morally driven, mentally powerful,
and‑‑perhaps
through computers‑‑physically endowed.
It merits
comment
that single high‑tech seers ("hackers") may exist within
low‑tech
environments (e.g. Colombia, Iran), and place their
services
at the disposal of criminals or zealots.
Low‑tech seers are perhaps the single most
dangerous threat
to
any established community because they represent an
alternative
or parallel infrastructure which can be used to
discreetly
undermine any organization. The bottom
line is
simple:
if the existing organization is not providing protection
and
economic stability for its population‑‑the center of gravity
in
most nations‑‑then the low tech seer, promising both salvation
and
comfort, will receive support. The low‑tech
seer also
dominates
in the moral arena by having a very powerful
ideological
construct which can move its members to heroic feats
against
physically more powerful and mentally more agile
opponents.
We as a Nation, with our nuclear and
conventional forces and
our
bureaucratic organization, fall into one of the four
categories,
that of "high‑tech brute". As
an aside, one observer
has
comment that we as a Nation have a tendency to try to fit
reality
to our force structure, rather than designing our force
structure
to fit reality. That is the point of
this paper‑‑to
highlight
the four different realities with which we must deal.
We are relatively well prepared to defend
ourselves against
other
high‑tech brutes, having just seen the demolition of the
Soviet
empire. This is however, the least
likely form of attack
against
us in the future.
We are completely vulnerable to attack
from the other three
kinds
of warrior, as illustrated below, and simultaneously
ineffective
in the attack against those three warrior classes.
Our challenge in the 1990's is two‑fold:
to significantly
reduce
our defense expenditures while also developing appropriate
capabilities
essential to protect our citizens and our property
against
all four warrior classes. This can only
be done by
radically
changing the way we train, organize, and equip selected
elements
of our forces.
What is the problem? As high‑tech brutes, we are the modern
equivalent
of dinosaurs sinking into two tar‑pits.
One is an
information
tar‑pit, overloading our now archaic sensor systems
(all
of which are designed to deal with "known" threat signatures
that
can be pre‑programmed). The other is a
mobility tar‑pit,
wherein
we are frustrated by our heavy logistics train and heavy
ground
and air mobility systems, constraining our ability to deal
with
fleet of foot "singleton" threats.
Our air power, our
artillery,
our armor‑‑all of these are marginally effective
against
the low‑intensity opponent, and also remarkably
vulnerable
to isolated attacks in garrison and rear areas.
Our existing command and control,
communications, computer,
and
intelligence (C3I) infrastructure is only geared for
confrontation
with other high tech brutes. We are
extremely
vulnerable
to covert attack by emerging high tech seers
(hackers),
to random attack by low tech brutes (narco‑barons),
and
to broad subversion by low tech seers (fanatics). For
example:
‑‑
Our increasing reliance on commercial communications
paths,
as well as our relative lack of computer security
procedures
throughout the government, when combined with the
pervasiveness
of telephone technology, enable a single hacker,
from
anywhere in the world, to shut down U.S. telephone switching
stations,
and contaminate with viruses virtually any unclassified
system. It merits comment that even if our classified
data may
be
safe, the telephone company operating systems, packet
switching
networks, and so on, are not encrypted or protected,
and
the flow of data will simply cease.
‑‑
The ability of narcotics barons to operate their
business
with impunity across our borders and within our
communities,
and the ability of terrorists to strike with
relative
impunity‑‑they don't play by our "rules"‑‑are well
recognized.
‑‑
Our susceptibility to cultural subversion, a
susceptibility
which stems in part from our national abdication
of
any cultural standards (e.g. imposing English as a national
language
in our schools), is less well recognized.
Unfortunately, between our Nation's
natural division into
nine
relatively distinct regions, the deterioration of our
schools,
and the strong ethnic roots that many of our immigrants
choose
to nurture long after their migration to our country, we
are
facing a period of internal cultural warfare which will have
a
deleterious impact on our ability to wage external cultural
warfare.
We exacerbate this situation by imposing
an expensive, slow
to
act and react, hierarchical command & control process on the
"brute"
force structure on our Nation, at a time when we require
a
relatively inexpensive, fast‑acting, "seer" capability able to
act
anywhere, anytime, without regard to any national, ethnic, or
religious
strictures. We persist is having
bureaucratic "turf
wars"
because no one has really come to grips with the fact that
we
are at war, now, in four different environments!
What does this analysis suggest? It suggests that warfare
in
the future will be fought at the platoon level, under
relatively
autonomous circumstances and with limited resource to
complex
combinations of combined arms.
Brainpower, understanding of local
cultures and conditions
including
operational geography, and highly responsive all‑source
tactical
intelligence will be critical force multipliers under
such
circumstances. Autonomous decision‑making
by the commander
(or
single Marine) on the spot will be the norm.
What is the solution? For selected elements of our national
defense
organization, we need to revisit our concepts of
operation,
doctrine, and force structure planning methodology,
substantially
reduce the base force idea, and think instead of
four
expanded and significantly improved capabilities:
‑‑
Paramilitary and clandestine/indigenous variants of our
Special
Forces to attack and destroy selected low tech brute
forces
on their home ground and without necessarily having the
support
of local host governments
‑‑
Foreign area experts, ideally with ethnic roots and
intuitive
understanding necessary to fully appreciate the nuances
of
religious and other forms of low tech ideology, and to develop
global
or precision ideological defense and attack campaigns
‑‑
Computer security (defense) and computer attack
specialists
able, with the selective assistance off tactical and
strategic
communications specialists to penetrate, monitor,
disrupt,
deceive, and dominate any computer or any communications
system
for any length of time, ideally without being detected
‑‑
Expeditionary and sea‑based variants of our
conventional
forces, able to conduct precision raids and guide
precision
munitions in coordination with covertly‑inserted
Special
Forces or indigenous clandestine assets.
Forces for Future Warfare
Vs. Low‑Tech Brute:
Paramilitary/Clandestine
Vs. Low‑Tech Seer: Foreign Area
Specialists
Vs. High‑Tech Seer: Computer
Specialists
Vs. High‑Tech Brute: Expeditionary
Forces
Figure 3. Forces for Future Warfare
Each of the above forces will have its own
requirements,
both
for C3I support to its planning, programming, and
operations;
and for C3I offensive capabilities against its
primary
warrior class opponent. We are not
ready!
Policy‑makers, political leaders, and
industrial managers
need
to think through four different kinds of national security
capability,
each with a different C3I defense/attack problem set,
and
each with a different concept, doctrine, training, and
acquisition
problem set.
The private sector, increasingly given to
forming its own
international
security corps and hiring specialists to protect
its
computers and its people, will have a role to play in the
multi‑dimensional
competition/conflict environment described in
this
paper.
One of the hardest policy problems‑‑with
significant legal
ramifications‑‑is
that of establishing dividing lines between the
public
and the private sector.
In a fast‑moving global environment, where
crime, culture,
and
knowledge cannot be controlled by any government or group of
governments,
we are finally going to have to come face to face
with
the possibility that the private sector can do things that
government
cannot not, and we may actually have to develop
methods
of "privatizing" certain security and
conflict/competition
functions.
Within the Marine Corps, these concepts
should translate
into
a substantially reinforced ability to conduct paramilitary
operations
(i.e. not necessarily in uniform), augmented by
tailored
clandestine human intelligence support networks in
countries
in high interest to the Marine Corps.
This should
result
also in a dramatically expanded investment in our Foreign
Area
Officer program (both active and reserve); ideally I would
like
to see every officer, and most non‑commissioned officers,
required
to learn and maintain a second language as a basis for
promotion. Truly expeditionary forces should by
definition be
led
if not manned by "foreign area officers". Finally, to deal
with
the severe threat to our communications and computers, I
would
create a C4 security occupational specialty, dedicate at
least
one officer and one non‑commissioned officer to computer
security
matters at each MAGTF or division/wing level, and
establish
an integrated Marine Corps C4I Security Plan which
provides
for training, equipping, and organizing our forces to be
effective
in a fragile C4 environment.
The GOOD NEWS is that these capabilities
will cost a
fraction
of what our high‑tech systems have cost and are
projected
to cost, and, with the exception of the linguistic and
cultural
warfare capabilities, can be stood up relatively
quickly. The money is there, but only if there is a
radical
reduction
in our investments against old technology and old
concepts.
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