The Air Force and the National Security Space Program 1946 - 1988 ...

Within the next few years United States political and military leaders will be setting the course of military space operations for the future. They will determine national space policy objectives, the attendant strategy, the mix of space forces required, and the military doctrine for employing these forces. A thorough understanding of astronautical history is thus crucial if these decisions are to be reasoned and informed, the more likely to increase national security and reduce the prospects of armed conflict than they are to imperil command and country. With the thought of contributing to that understanding, at the request of the Office of Air Force History, through the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, I undertook this brief history of the United States Air Force and the national security space program, 1946-1986. Officials in the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office decided on classifying this work at the TK level so that it could be made available to a larger number ot people directly involved in space program planning and flight operations. bomb. (G) In 1949 Soviet scientists successfully tested an atomic That test ended the American nuclear monopoly and it encouraged the building of even more awesome thermonuclear weapons. It also caused American leaders in the early 1950s to judge an atomic: s:_;rprise attack on this country to be a distinct and terrifyi~g possibility. A nuclear Pearl Harbor, all could agree, had so~ehow to be precluded; more tha~ ever before, forewarned meant forearmed. Early warning of a surprise attack, that is a war~ing days or weeks in advance, could only be secured t~rough TOP SECHE'T' HA:,DLE VIA T."rLEH'f' J(2rHo::-_.E CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY Vlll NRO Approved for Release Declassified by: C/IRRG Declassified on: 30 June 2014 crop SECHET HAN"DLE VIA WtLEUT KEYHIOLE CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY overhead reconnu 1 ssanc~e conduct cd from very gh altit This r:at·onaJ requirement precipitated the U.S. military space prourarr:, and in this history the Air Force in space, strategic reconnaissance became quite naturally a principal focus of attention. +&t This history does not address military space programs that are largely uncJassif ied, the communication and navigation satellite efforts, for example; that activity is for the most part avail e in the open literature. This is not exclusively an "Air Force" history. Nor is it a technical history of reconnaissance satellites or their missile-detection and meteorological con~anions performing related defense-support funct in space. Rather, s work addresses the Air Force role as.it evolved in the military space program and the important political, military, and policy issues that the en se at its hard core. I have attempt to explain how and why American leaders began a n0t1 ::>pace program, why they divided and zed it in military and civil branches, and why the Air Force was appointed to manuge and conduct--but not direct--much of the rn:ltion 1 s milit<;i:ry spacetaring. I furt,her sought to plumb the reasoning behind early U.S. space policy as it rela to national security space operations, and analyze the profound ettects that reconnaissance scttellites have had on ernat1onal tions during the lasl quarter ce~tury. The st,udy is therefore broader in scope than the title alone mi at (irst imp : S /TIO A number of individuals contributed materially to this , and I am indebted to them. Edward V. Stearns and William W. Kellogg s~ared their recollections of the early days at TOP SECRE'f' Hl-'d-JDI,JE VIA WtDEl;':' J~EYIIGL:: CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY lX NRO Approved for Release Declassified by: C/IRRG Declassified on: 30 June 2014 TOP SEG&ET HANDLE VIA PALEN'l' 1CBYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS ONLY Rand and Lockheed; Larry E. Jenkins and Stanley I. Weiss of Lockheed critiqued the Agena. story; Lt Col Donald B. Dodd, USAFR, he:ped greatly with unclassified research; Donald Welzenbach of the CIA.History Office counselled on technical details and critiqued the draft chapters; Jimmie D. Hill of the National Reconnaissance Office provided background on the NRO in an institutional setting; and Colonel William Davidson .{SAF/AAZ) obtained key docwnents that made this study possible. Finally, special thanks are owed - and in the National Reconnaissance Office. 3.3 (b)(1) Despite a full schedule, they conscientiously edited and typed the manuscri.pt as an "additional duty." Any errors of omission or commission that may remain are mine alone. R. Cargill Hall Washington DC August 1988 More http://www.governmentattic.org/12docs/USAFandNSecSpacePgm1946-1988.pdf