Conspiracism and Rhetoric

 

Thomas A. Adamo

Didymus29@aol.com

1. INTRODUCTION

Conspiracy theories have virtually exploded into the public consciousness over the past decade. This trend has become so conspicuous that it has attracted the attention of major media outlets. Newsweek published an article in late 1996 proclaiming, “Conspiracy paranoia is surrounding us. … Fomented on the Internet, mass-marketed by Hollywood, Conspiracism has become a kind of para-religion.” Citing a survey from George magazine, the authors went on to claim that: “The ranks of the darkly deluded may be growing … three quarters of Americans believe that “the Government is involved in conspiracy.” Depending on your level of venality, that statistic can be read as either mass psychosis or a marketing opportunity (Marin & Gegax, 1). Observing this, yet another source speculated, “Maybe conspiracy theories are just the gossip of the global village.” (Ramsey, 2 & 5)

The purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the growing persuasive appeal of conspiracy theories within mainstream American society. The examination and analysis of the literature associated with this phenomenon will determine some of the rhetorical factors that contribute to its appeal. Juxtaposition of a conspiracy text with the evaluative standards of Aristotlean rhetoric will attempt to determine the types of persuasive methodologies employed within this phenomenon. Finally, this will lead to a discussion focused on the larger question of how purveyors of socially aberrant narratives seek to gain audiences, and why audiences would be drawn to such narratives.

As conspiracy theories become a more prominent and mainstream form of cultural discourse, it will be increasingly necessary to evaluate these narratives to determine how they reflect the anxieties of the broader culture. Professor Joli Jenson clarified the challenge and goal of this type of research:

Social narratives are convincing because they engage and confirm the taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. This means they are particularly hard to analyze, refute, or surpass. But if we can temporarily suspend ... belief in a particular social narrative and examine its central terms and logic, we can at least partially question its usefulness. ... [We must] locate and clarify the fundamental assumptions that operate in this terrain, in order to make them available for reassessment. (Jensen, 13-14)

Conspiracy theories exist in nearly every culture and have generally mirrored social currents largely at odds with cultural mainstream. Their presence and prominence can serve as a barometer to chart the direction of the larger culture through the activities of this counterculture. However, without a proper understanding of the thinking that precedes this type of mindset, the researcher of particular facets of this phenomenon can easily become mired in a labyrinth of rhetoric and details that defies examination. Therefore, gaining a broader understanding of these theories, and examining the basic presuppositions of their theoretical constructs, should lead to conclusions regarding why specific individuals and groups adhere to them.

The United States has historically been fertile ground for conspiracy stories of all types, but as certain elements of society have begun to take these forms of communication seriously enough to act of them - the Oklahoma City bombing being the most prominent and tragic example - it is becoming increasingly necessary to understand this particular type of social narrative. If conspiracy theories were solely the domain of a radical counterculture, then an analysis would not prove to be as challenging since these theories would be located in specific, easily identifiable segments of society. However the past decade has witnessed an explosion of popular belief in a variety of conspiracy theories.

These ideas spread rapidly through the media of modern technology, particularly the Internet, television, and film. As these messages gain increased reception by the general public, there is a very great likelihood that they will begin to permeate the Weltanschauung, that is the fundamental world-view, of average citizens. Considering the violence that this type of thinking has caused recently, and historically, the growing acceptance of Conspiracism, as Pipes has termed it, is a cause for concern. Therefore, gaining an understanding of why Conspiracism has grown in acceptance is crucial in determining where this widespread acceptance may lead, and how to counter its negative influences.

The focus of this research is neither to prove nor disprove specific conspiracy theories, but rather to determine the rhetorical influences that operate to keep these narratives alive. Also, although it is undeniable that true conspiracies have occurred throughout history, and that these plots have been instrumental in fomenting further conspiracy theories, this study is specifically concerned with the conspiracy theory as a form of cultural communication (See Marin & Gegax, 3; Pipes, 20-1).

Surprisingly, while there are many outlets to find information about extant conspiracy theories, a primary literature dealing with conspiracy theories as a social phenomenon is virtually nonexistent. This investigation will be important for a variety of fields that focus on human behavior, particularly the aberrant variety. These fields would include, but would not be limited to communication, rhetoric, political science, journalism, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and law enforcement. Each of these academic spheres involves the study of motivations and actions in human behavior.

Despite the extensive detail used by conspiracy theorists to corroborate their claims, it will become apparent that the primary persuasive tools generally used in Conspiracism are fear, anxiety, and paranoia. Incredulous amounts of information are used in the construction of various theories, but behind this facade the conspiracy theory is primarily an ideological and emotional appeal based on a supposition of fear. This technique reflects Nazi propagandist Hugo Ringler, who insisted,

It was not so much the contents of speech as it was the manner in which it was delivered that influenced the listener and won him to us. ... There are speakers who investigate and carve up their subject with almost scientific exactitude and utterly forget that they are supposed to be preaching a worldview. (Ringler, 1)

Therefore, even when contrary proof is presented, the legitimacy of conspiracy theories are not undermined for true believers, because their commitment is to a worldview, not to truly inductive reasoning. For instance, the paradoxical conceptions of some theorists plainly dictate that the apparent absence of conspiracy is the greatest proof of conspiracy. Although the primary focus of this research is persuasive technique, it will also attempt to address larger issues, such as whether Conspiracism is a legitimate pursuit of truth, or the propagation of a worldview.

As conspiracy theories become a more prominent feature in popular discourse, there is every reason to believe that adherence to Conspiracism will become more wide spread. As previously mentioned, this could be problematic when individuals place such faith in these narratives that they are motivated to action. The influence that conspiracy theories have over the actions of their adherents will be a primary criterion in determining the effects of Conspiracism on society as a whole.

This study will be divided into five sections which will each play an important role in investigating the rhetorical methodologies that conspiracy theories utilize in attempting to influence modern culture. The first section is this introduction where an effort has been made to demonstrate the necessity and goals of this research. The second section will review literature on the subject and implications of conspiracy theory and culture.

Section three will propose a methodology based on Neo-Aristotlean rhetorical criticism, adapted for written narratives, to analyze the content of conspiracy literature. The fourth section will be the application of this research model, using G. Edward Griffin’s The Creature from Jekyll Island as a primary text of study. This book purports to demonstrate how the Federal Reserve System, in league with international banking interests, is a front organization seeking to disrupt the world economy with the ultimate purpose of establishing a one-world government. Finally, the fifth section will contain the final conclusions formulated from the preceding sections.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Considering the historical frequency of Conspiracism in American culture, there are remarkably few pieces of literature devoted specifically to exploring the rhetorical supports of this social narrative type. The available research tends to follow three basic categories. The first studies are generally more current and examine the growing prominence of conspiracy theories in contemporary society. The second form of literature examines the nature and content of conspiracy theories. These pieces were often small sections of larger studies originating from such diverse disciplines as the social sciences, history, and philosophy. Finally, several recent articles have made preliminary forays into the persistence of Conspiracism as a worldview.

Ted Goertzel, of Rutgers University, has conducted quantitative research attempting to measure how likely individuals are to believe in specific conspiracy theories. Goertzel found that, when asked to rate ten conspiracy theories on a scale of believability, 93% of respondents chose at least one to be “definitely” or “probably” true (Goertzel, 735). He later concluded:

The tendency to believe in conspiracies is correlated with anomia, with a lack of trust in people, and with feelings of insecurity … The strong correlation with the scale of Anomia indicates that belief in conspiracies is associated with feelings of alienation and disaffection from the system. (Goertzel, 738-9)

These conclusions strongly support the rationale that instances of Conspiracism relate to more generalized feelings of anxiety and mistrust. Goertzel goes on to discuss the theoretical implications of his results. He concluded that most conspiracy theories were monological in nature, that is they tended to ignore their contexts in all but the shallowest respects. These constructs are useful to adherents because, “they provide an easy, automatic explanation for any new phenomenon which might threaten the belief system.” Observing this tendency, Goertzel concluded, “The key issue is not the belief in a specific conspiracy, but the logical processes which led to that belief” (Goertzel, 740).

Pipes noticed this as well and remarked on how the study of Conspiracism stands in unmistakable contrast to the theoretical frameworks currently employed in most academic fields that, influenced by Marxism, favor pragmatism as a primary motivation for human action as opposed to ideas. He stated, “The study of Conspiracism assumes that ideas have consequences. … Passion, faith, fear, and idealism matter. Even the most ruthless and cynical rulers – a Heinrich Himmler or a Stalin – are swayed by ideas and know their power over others. Indeed, one can go further and describe the fascist and communist experience as efforts at living out intellectual dreams” (Pipes, 51). Actions inspired by Conspiracism demonstrate that pragmatic reasoning is not the only source of human behavior.

Ramsay identified several factors contributing to the apparently growing dissemination of conspiracy theories: computer technology, advanced systems of communications, and the gullibility of the general public. Ramsay also referred to a number of instances since the early 1960s where, if actual conspiracies were not involved, government actions could be easily viewed as conspiratorial in nature (Ramsay, 4-5). As another source phrased it, “These bizarre fantasies would seem safely ridiculous if they didn’t occasionally turn out to be true” (Marin & Gegax, 3).

According to Berlet, “the term conspiracy theorist refers to someone whose analysis of documents, statements, and other evidence has become uncoupled from a logical train of thought” (Berlet, 1-2). Others may argue that conspiracy theorists are not illogical, they merely voice logical arguments based on faulty premises. Nevertheless, framing an argument in terms of conspiracy does not automatically classify it as an instance of Conspiracism. As Pipes stated, “One cannot treat Winston Churchill’s warnings of the Nazi conspiracy in the 1930s on a par with Hitler’s contemporous ravings about a Jewish conspiracy” (Pipes, 37-8). While Churchill’s conclusions proceeded from the analysis of extant evidence, Hitler attempted to reinforce a presupposed worldview. Their differences, in terms of highlighting perceived conspiracies, stemmed from fundamental presuppositions. This would tend to confirm that Conspiracism is more concerned with preserving itself as an ideology, than with uncovering real conspiracies. Philosopher Karl Popper expressed similar sentiments,

The ‘conspiracy theory of society’ … which is more primitive than most forms of theism, is akin to Homer’s theory of society. Homer conceived the power of the gods in such a way that whatever happened on the plain before Troy was only a reflection of the various conspiracies on Olympus. The conspiracy theory of society is just such a version of this theism, of a belief in gods whose whims and wills rule everything. It comes from abandoning God and then asking: “Who is in his place?” His place is then filled by various powerful men and groups – sinister pressure groups, who are to be blamed for having planned the great depression and all the evils from which we suffer. (Popper, 123)

The most predominant piece of research concerning the influence of conspiracy theories on culture is Richard Hofstadter’s essay entitled The Paranoid Style in American Politics. Originally delivered as a lecture in 1962, this short work has virtually monopolized the study of Conspiracism, or the “paranoid style” as he termed it, and culture. Hofstadter defined the conspiratorial frame of mind as an essential worldview where:

The model on which the world is interpreted contains the same exaggeration, the same crusading mentality, the same sense that all of our ills can be traced to a single center and hence can be eliminated by some kind of final act of victory over the evil source. If the warnings of those who diagnose the central treachery are not heeded soon enough, it is argued, we are finished: the world confronts an apocalypse of a sort prefigured in the Book of Revelation. (Hofstadter, xii)

Building on this foundation, he began to frame more specific assertions regarding the conspiratorial mind, writing that the “paranoid style [includes] qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy. … It is the paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant. The feeling of persecution is central, and it is indeed systematized in grandiose themes of conspiracy” (Hofstadter, 3-4). Hofstadter recognized that Conspiracism, as a worldview, was not so distressing as the fact that otherwise ordinary people often articulated and believed these ideas. This was explained as a symptom of a larger lack of discernment among segments of the American public.

After placing conspiracy ideas in their historical and contemporaneous context, Hofstadter proceeded to describe the basic rhetorical style of conspiracy theories. He did not object to the idea that conspiracies have been a motivating force in history. However, he found the obsession with “vast and sinister” conspiracies as the central focus of all historical events to be problematic. In conceptual terms, “The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms – he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values” (Hofstadter, 30-31). The absolute demands of Conspiracism, contrasted with the limited possibilities of satisfactory outcomes, caused Hofstadter to envision the paranoid state of mind as a self-fulfilling prophecy incapable of resolution.

Hofstadter observed that rhetorical methodology used by conspiracy theorists is intensely rationalistic. First, a specific theory is articulated. Exhaustive collections of evidence then attempt to demonstrate the probability of implausible scenarios. The documentation will present a far more coherent presentation of reality than is physically possible. There is no room for accidents, mistakes, failures, or ambiguities. Hofstadter concluded, “What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts … but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events” (Hofstadter, 35-37).

In Hofstadter’s estimation, the “paranoid style,” or Conspiracism, is primarily rhetoric of the dispossessed. Praying on the anxieties of their audiences, the purveyors of this narrative use fear and manipulation to gain their various goals. Although subsequent researchers attacked Hofstadter’s contention the “paranoid” view could build arguments based on legitimate sources, Smith’s reevaluation concluded that Hofstadter’s fundamental premises were correct: “Apparently the political “paranoid” is able to present evidence accurately – or more precisely, as accurately as “non-paranoids” … any marked difference between a “Paranoid Style” and a “non-paranoid” style would appear to stem (as Hofstadter originally suggested) from the manner in which each style draws inferences from evidence to warrant its conclusions” (Smith, 289).

Davis reflected the thinking of Popper, writing that, “throughout our history there has been a striking discrepancy between the pitiful weakness and incompetence of most conspirators and the willingness of many Americans to believe that a powerful monolithic, and virtually infallible organization was about to overthrow the Republic” (Davis, xv; See Also Bidinotto, 1). Bale enunciated several attributes tending to characterize perceived conspirators: “Evil incarnate … monolithic … unerring … omnipresent … omnipotent. … the motive force of all historical change and development” (Bale, 3-4). This also reflects Popper’s concept that conspiracy theorists tend to project attributes of deity on to the subjects of their studies. Lipset and Raab contended that, “The conspiracy theory is an extension of historical moralism, peculiarly designed to legitimate the closing down of the ideational marketplace – that is, providing a rationale for accomplishing the very thing the conspiracy theory is presumably directed against: the manipulation of the many by the few” (Lipset & Raab, 17).

Recently, Spark and Knight hoped to open a renewed dialogue in order to determine the why Conspiracism continues to find an audience in what purports to be a sophisticated culture. They describe current fascination with conspiracy theories, “as a symptomatic feature of the contemporary condition, the very popularity of conspiracy clearly also figures a postmodern collapse of distinctions between the literal and the metaphorical, the factual and the fictional” (Spark & Knight, 2-5). What these two British scholars have proposed, in view of the apparent failure of traditional intellectual constructs in the face of modern and post-modern society, is that Conspiracism may be an effective rhetorical model through which to reconstruct various modes of information collation. Their context does not seem to indicate that this is necessarily the most ideal method, but the construct of conspiracy theory, particularly in light of Bale’s statements, has proved to be an effective method of simplifying vast complexities.

This literature review has demonstrated that Conspiracism and conspiracy theorists are generally deductive constructs: a worldview in search of evidence. These idealistic interpretations of reality defy the expectations of pragmatism, and generally employ deductive modes of reasoning to reach their conclusions. Nevertheless, the research indicates that conspiracy theories will often contain exhaustive, and thoroughly logical, arguments based on specific presuppositions. The significance that these stories and constructs have for various segments of the general population makes them important objects of study. The literature indicates that the paradigm of conspiracy theory can greatly simplify and distill otherwise complex social narratives. Finally, conspiracy theories seemed to embody rhetorical constructs for those who viewed themselves as dispossessed. Therefore, conspiracy theories generally articulated feelings of insecurity, alienation, and disaffection.

3. METHODOLOGY

This research will attempt to critique a conspiracy theory using an adaptation of the canons of classical rhetoric, as primarily embodied in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. According to Foss this approach, as a form of rhetorical analysis, has been generally out of favor in the Communication field (Foss, 1996, 27). Labeled Neo-Aristotlean, this critical approach came under criticism due to the Rhetoric’s design as an instructional text. Nevertheless, this approach contains several features that make it an attractive paradigm for the analysis of persuasive appeals. Through systematizing principles of rhetoric and logic in argument preparation, the Rhetoric naturally becomes a standard for measuring persuasive appeal. Therefore, the use of the Rhetoric as a model for evaluation is a legitimate pursuit. In the present context, this exploration will reflect Smith’s use of the application of Aristotelian-Toulminian theories of logic in the examination of Hofstadter’s hypothesis (Smith, 277).

Aristotle described rhetoric as “the power of discovering what the available means of persuasion are when addressing specific issues” (Aristotle, 1.2). Wichelns, one of the early Neo-Aristoteleans, was mainly concerned with the direct affect of a message on an audience (Foss, 1996, 24). Moreover, his primary focus was to use these standards in conjunction with spoken messages. Application of the Rhetoric’s criteria to the text under consideration will accomplish this goal. The larger purpose is to expand this paradigm in application to persuasive appeals generally.

Traditionally, there have been five accepted canons of Aristotlean, or classical, rhetoric: memory, delivery, style, organization, and invention. The first two canons deal specifically with oral communication and are not relevant to the present study. The examination of style will focus on the use of language, and its overall contribution to the communicators’ goal of persuasion. Thesis development, metaphor, language use, and expressed ideas seek to create an intended response. Under the canon of organization, the examination of potential persuasive power of argument arrangement will take place. Finally, the canon of invention will analyze pathos, ethos, and logos, of the conspiracy argument. The pathos of appeals will explore what role the stimulation of emotion in an audience plays in a persuasive communication. The appeal of ethos seeks to establish the credibility of the communicator and his or her argument. Typical examples of this type of appeal will reference the author’s credentials, or other authorities. Consideration of the logos or logic of the argument will determine the type of reasoning used in the observed text.

Observed in this context, the stylistic analysis of metaphor in Conspiracism becomes specifically valuable. Lawrence Rosenfeld has observed:

The metaphor is, as Aristotle held, a sign of genius, an emblem of the individual’s momentary withdrawal from the world into his mental landscape, even as he retains contact with the sensible world with the thread of a language figure … the mental cohesion of inward and outward signaled by the metaphor is the vehicle by which the mind sustains its vitality and “recreates” those attending the rhetorical moment. (Foss, 1985, 145)

The use of metaphors provides a tremendous source of persuasive strength to conspiracy theories, as well as to other socially anomalous messages – such as religious cults, for example. Combined with the elements of organization, pathos, ethos, and logos, metaphorical constructs create a rhetorical environment that is dynamically energetic. This energy is the fuel for the persuasive engine, and the primary object of this inquiry.

4. APPLICATION

The Creature from Jekyll Island, by G. Edward Griffin, purports to demonstrate that the Federal Reserve is a banking cartel created by a cabal of banking interests with a secret agenda running contrary to the public interest. Through an extended discussion that includes economic and monetary theory, banking, and history Griffin claimed that the Federal Reserve, working in concert with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, is an apparatus designed to help create world wide inflation and debt. The ultimate goal of this cartel is the creation of a socialist one-world government: the New World Order (101, 107-8).[1]

Stylistically, Griffin developed his economic thesis based on five “Natural Laws of Human Behavior in Economics” (592-3). His specific use of the term “natural law” to describe his observations is significant. The term “natural law” has existed, at least since the time of Thomas Aquinas, to describe those legal concepts considered universal (Feinberg, 17). Therefore, by using this term, Griffin attempted to invest his observations with the authority of over 700 years of jurisprudence. His laws essentially state that money supplies not based on precious metals, and gauged by a system of honest weights and measures, will cause economic hardship and political disunity to inevitably follow. Following this context, Griffin asserted that the Federal Reserve, the World Bank, and the IMF use the mechanism of foreign aid from industrialized nations to third world nations to weaken them both: the former through the loss of money to loans that will probably never be repaid, and the later into a debtor’s servitude (130, 109). These actions all serve to forward the plans of the Council on Foreign Relations, described by Griffin as “the hidden government of the United States,” and “a front for J.P. Morgan and Company” (110, 273). Their hidden agenda is “the building of world socialism,” however Griffin posits that the great obstacle to the accomplishment of this goal is the economic independence of the United States (95, 514-5). Therefore, these duplicitous organizations have the military and economic weakening of the United States as a prime directive (see 516-532). In G. Edward Griffin’s world, all treaties, organizations, and prominent persons have ulterior agendas, and nothing happens by accident (130).

Griffin attempted to have metaphor play a prominent role in invigorating his presentation. His hope was to make the story, “as fascinating as any work of fiction could be” (iii). He describes his research as setting “off into the dark forest to do battle with the evil dragon” (i). The title itself is his label for the Federal Reserve: the Creature from Jekyll Island. This imagery recurs in one section title: “What Creature is this?” and two chapter titles: “The Creature Comes to America,” and “The Creature Swallows Congress.” Other section and chapter titles included: “The New Alchemy,” “A Tale of Three Banks,” “Time Travel into the Future,” “The Secret Science,” and “The Best Enemy Money can Buy.” However, apart from sectional headings, he did not generally follow through with this sense of imagery within the text. As a result, metaphorical images often seemed disconnected from the substance of the text. They would appear and disappear, almost at random, and did very little to add to the text’s cohesion.

Another device Griffin used, specifically in the first and twenty-fifth chapters, was narrative. In each case information was presented in a novella form in order to convey his message with a sense of drama. Both sought to arouse feelings of fear and intrigue to drive their point’s home. The former highlighted the meeting that gave birth to “the Creature.” It helped set the stage for the exposition that followed. The latter was Griffin’s “Pessimistic Scenario,” outlining the United States’ final initiation into the New World Order. This section was transparently modeled after George Orwell’s 1984. Griffin claimed that Orwell’s book was a primary archetype for those who sought the destruction of the United States (558). He used this opportunity to summarize and reinforce his main points in a dramatically charged context, and it set the tone for the final chapter that outlined Griffin’s solution to the problem of the Federal Reserve.

Organization is a problematic concept in The Creature from Jekyll Island. At the outset, Griffin stated: “Since this is not a textbook, we are not confined to a chronological structure. The subject matter is not a curriculum to be mastered but a mystery to be solved” (1). Even if the text had been written chronologically, Griffin’s rambling prose and disjointed structure would make his argument convoluted and hard to follow. The references cited in the earlier stylistic outline of Griffin’s theory, attest that important facets of his theory are scattered throughout the text with little appreciation for cohesion. As the review above highlighted, sifting through the text will reveal his basic argument, but only after a great deal of effort. Part of his organizational style is to provide far too much detail to make every point, as well as to indulge tangents of every variety. For instance, several pages are spent speculating about the real reason for the Lincoln assassination (390-4). The conspiracy mentioned in this instance had nothing to do with the overall theme of the book, and it did not add anything to the book except for several additional pages of text. At this juncture a question must be asked: When one is constructing a conspiracy theory, does size matter? Phrased another way, is the structure of The Creature from Jekyll Island a product of editorial incompetence, or is the confusing structure a conscious move in order to impress readers with the scope and complexity of the subject matter? Griffin promotes himself as someone who has “a talent for researching difficult topics and presenting them in clear terms that all can understand” (dustcover). The organization of The Creature from Jekyll Island does not support that assertion. In fact, the size, complexity, and disorganization of the text could serve to tax readers’ faculties to the point where just about any argument offered by the author might seem reasonable.

According to Aristotle, a communicator should avoid arousing strong emotions in an audience, because their judgment will be warped (Aristotle, 1.1). However, in another place – speaking of the use of fear as a means of persuasion – he stated, “the speaker must bring them into the right frame of mind so that they shall take themselves to be the kind of people who are likely to suffer” (Aristotle, 2.5). Fear is the emotion that encapsulates the pathos of The Creature from Jekyll Island. According to Griffin:

In spite of two incomes, the real net worth of the average household is falling. The amount of leisure time is shrinking. The percentage of Americans who own their home is dropping. The age at which a family acquires a first home is rising. The number of families counted among the middle class is falling. The size of family savings is smaller. The number of people living below the officially defined poverty level is rising. The rate of personal bankruptcy is triple of what it was in the 1960’s. Over 90% of all Americans are broke at age 65. (514)

Although the assertions above were provided without any documentation, Griffin also made sure to cite other issues that should concern the average American such as depleted purchasing power, trade deficits, foreign ownership of American property, recession, and the incredible profits reaped by financial institutions from war (20, 145, 230-3, 512). Finally - after implicating currency debasement as a major factor in the fall of the Roman Empire – Griffin wove his theories of the Federal Reserve and the New World Order as the cause for this multitude of woes (22-3, 110-2, 150-1). The dissemination of fear is indispensable to Griffin’s persuasive model.

The ethos of The Creature from Jekyll Island comes from a variety of sources. Although the Aristotlean standard of ethos calls for credibility to be established within the text of an argument, adjacent considerations – such as credentials, or even the purchasing process - may also be influential (Aristotle, 1.2). Griffin’s web site (www.realtiyzone.com) is a fully functional, online storefront. The ordering process is quick and easy. At any given time a customer can know exactly where an order is in the delivery process. Purchases, shipped via United Parcel Service, are Internet monitored from conception to delivery. These peripheral issues of customer service advance the credibility of the author, and by extension his text, even before delivery. The book itself, at 608 pages, is physically weighty. One would presume that this would also reflect on the quality of the contents. Likewise, the bibliography of over 180 titles also creates the impression that this is an important work. The dustcover provides a summary of the book, testimonials, and a lengthy exposition on the credentials of the author. These physical features all contribute to the perceptual credibility of the book.

As mentioned earlier, the structure of The Creature from Jekyll Island was convoluted to the point of confusion. This may have been the product of either a conscious editorial decision, or ineptitude. In either case, the additional effort required to outline the facets of Griffin’s theory creates additional steps of complexity in an already complex work. This served to make the book seem more cerebral. The production of such a large and complex work receives an aura of credibility by the sheer act of its creation. Moreover, following the elaborate construction of the book, Griffin’s solution to the problem of the Federal Reserve is very simple. Although an act of Congress is all that would be required to end the Federal Reserve system, Griffin proposed a sixteen-point plan to simultaneously return to a gold standard and eradicate the Federal Reserve, with relatively minimal negative repercussions on national economic life. He then encouraged the reader to educate others for the purpose of reversing current trends through the election of Representatives and Senators. He emphasized expediting this process, inserting rare instance of direct metaphor, saying:

The Creature has grown large and powerful since its conception on Jekyll Island. It now roams across every continent and compels the masses to serve it, feed it, obey it, worship it. If it is not slain, it will become our eternal lord and master. … The crusade has already begun. (588)

Finally, there is the logos of the argument constructed by Griffin. Aristotle contended that induction, deriving a general concept through the observation of specific cases, is the basis for all reason (Aristotle, 2.20). The fact that this idea is the basis of most scientific methodologies tends to confirm his accuracy on this point.[2] Therefore, one would expect the exhaustive examination of a subject to be inductive in nature. This is not the case in The Creature from Jekyll Island. Before examining a single issue, the existence of conspiracy was already perceived as a given. When he finally got around to it, Griffin stated his primary guiding presupposition quite simply: “Conspiracies are the norm, not the exception” (130).

5. CONCLUSION

Conspiracy is in the eye of the beholder. A conspiracy text may follow every “legitimate” rhetorical principle extent, using accurate facts and reasoning. However the key to conspiracy theories is not only in their rhetoric, but also in their presuppositions. The waning influence of traditional mores and myths in modern culture may partially explain the growth of Conspiracism. Karl Popper postulated that the conspiracy theory of society resulted from abandoning God in favor of lesser gods: sinister groups responsible for a multitude of evils (Popper, 123). The conspiracy theorist is a builder of mythos, and has a tendency to take on the office prophet. Even a secular writer such as G. Edward Griffin has seemingly received such a divine anointing:

I have just finished reading your marvelous book, and must declare that the information you presented has cleared more sleep from my eyes than any other printed information, with exception to the Holy Bible. And I recognize that the Holy Spirit of GOD is with you in your investigative journey. (Testimonial from the American Media web site: www.realityzone.com)

Hofstadter described conspiracy theories as rhetoric of the dispossessed. In terms of rhetorical style, conspiracy theories tap into the hopes, dreams and aspirations of individuals, especially those who fell they are dispossessed in some way, on a para-religious level. They attempt to do this by taking the chaos of reality and molding it into a systematic structure, albeit often through the highly suspect invocation of fear. Finally, conspiracy theories have one particular stylistic advantage over almost every other type of persuasive communication: neutrality or equivocation is impossible. Moreover, an essential aspect of Conspiracism is the call to action. Due to these factors, conspiracy theories demand decisions, they demand actions, and they demand them now.

From the perspectives of communication and rhetoric, this dynamic insistence may be a key factor to explaining the popular interest in conspiracy theories. Very few social, religious, or political movements in history have started without a call to action. However, in the realm of Conspiracism, practically the only requirement from the audience is a response. However, the fact that this dynamism is fueled by such raw emotions as fear, anxiety, and paranoia make an endorsement of this persuasive construct problematic, if not impossible. Through the invocation of these volatile passions, according to Aristotlean theory, the judgment of an audience may be impaired, invalidating the legitimacy of a message. At this point persuasion becomes manipulation, and any “good” proceeding from such a message may be suspect at best. This is a very broad assertion. Confirmation will only be possible through the application of the methodology employed here to a wide variety of conspiracy texts, and a collation and analysis of the collected results. This would form a cohesive basis for an in-depth qualitative analysis of Conspiracism as a social construct.

Finally, in addition to forming an analytical paradigm for the examination of conspiracy theory as a communication form, this research has also demonstrated other important points. First, the tenets and techniques G. Edward Griffin provided a specific case study in conspiracy rhetoric and methodology. The findings of this particular study, combined with the review of earlier literature, tend to indicate where a broader qualitative examination of Conspiracism would probably lead. Also, through the specific use of a classical methodology, this research has demonstrated that Aristotlean precepts provide a broad framework for the analysis, and even deconstruction, of persuasive messages. This analytical method will continue as a useful tool, examining the employment of language as a persuasive tool for Conspiracism, as well as in other social messages.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle. Lane Cooper, ed. The Rhetoric. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1932.

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[1] Interestingly, Griffin is not entirely opposed to a world government per se. See p. 515.

[2] Incidentally, Aristotle preferred deductive reasoning when dealing with an issue rhetorically, but this seems to be a stylistic distinction (Aristotle, 2.20).